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WILLIAM H. PAINTER, chairman:  Mr.  Painter is a professor of law at 
the Uniwrsity of Illinois. He graduated from Princeton University in 1950 
and did one year of postgraduate won there before soins on to law 
school at Harvard. He received his law degree in 1954. for four years he 
was associdted with the New York law firm 0( Oe...ebois, Plimpton, and 
Mclean, and, in  1958, he began his teaching career at the University of 
Illinois. from June 197! to fall 1972, Mr. Painter served as special counsel 
and director of the U.s. House of  Representatives Study cl the Securities 
Industry, conducted by the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, 
Committee on  Interstate  and Foreign  Commerce. 
DONALD  M. Ffl!ElSTfIN:  Mr.  Feuerstein is a general partner and 
counsel of Salomon Brothers. He spent four years, from 196610 1970, 
with  the  Securities  and  Excha"f!je  Commission  as  asMstant ..... 
cooosel and I.,  as chief counsel-markels 01 the InstitutionaIIrweeIDr 
Study.  He  is  a member d  the Foreign  CommifIee  and Third MIdItt 
Disclosure  Committee  of the  NASO,  the  Committee  on SecuriIies 
Regulation  of the Association of the Bar of the City of New Yotk, 1hr 
Advisory  Council  of the  Uni~ty 01  Pennsylvania  Center  tor  die 
Study of Financial Institutions, the Executi~  Committee d  the lJnf\Ier-
sity d  California Securities ReIJIlation  Institute, and she ComnUIIiIe Oft 
Federal  Reguiation  of Securities of the American  Bar AsIoc:iMiaA.  He 
graduated  from  Yale  UnNersity  with  a  B.A.,  and holds a J.D .... 
Harvard  Law  School. 
IOIfIT M.  NEWMAN:  Mr.  Newman is  a pam. in Ihe ...  fI I 
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Weiss,  Peck  & Greer.  Before joining that firm,  he  wa~ a trader in  li~ted 
and  unlisted  bank  ~iock<; with  Salomor.  Brothers. 
BARRY  E.  TAGUE:  Mr.  TaglJP  is  executiv(' vice  president  and  vice 
chairman of Raymond, James & Associates,  Inc., Philadelphia.  In  1974 
he  was  elected chairman of the  board of governors  of  the  PBW  Stock 
Exchange,  Inc.,  the youngest person  ever to  hold  that  position.  He  has 
been  a participant  on  the  Securities  Industry  Task  Force  and  related 
committees  looking into the  development  of a central  market  system. 
PAINTER:  The  topic  of our  panel  today  is  the  composite  quotation 
system.  The composite tape obviously is  historical in its  approach. In other 
words,  the  tape  tells  you  what  has  taken  place.  It  reports  transactions 
which  have  already  transpired.  The  composite  quotation system,  on  the 
other hand,  if fully implemented. would give people who have  access  to 
the  cen~ral market system  an  ability to determine the  most  favorable  bid 
and  asked quotes  in  any component part of the  sYstem,  whether the  New 
York Stock Exchange,  the Midwest or Pacific stock exchanges, the PBW, or 
the  third  market,  if integrated  into the  system. 
Just  by  way  of background,  I  think  it  might  be  helpful  to  sketch  out 
where  we  are.  As  you  know,  in  May  the  Senate  passed  S.  2519.  the 
National  Securities  Market  System  Act  of 1974.  That  bill' gives  the  SEC 
broad regulatory authority with regard  to the establishment of a composite 
quotation  system,  and  in a great  many other areas  as  well.  Included  is  a 
clause  under  which  registration  with  the  SEC  is  required  of  securities 
information processors,  i.e.,  people who gather the quotes and  make them 
available to members of the  market system. As  Harvey Rowen pointed out 
this  morning, a somewhat similar measure,  H.R.  5050,  has  been  reported 
out  favorably  by  the  House  Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Com-
merce.  To my understanding the  bili does  not,  like its  Senate counterpart, 
require  the  actual  registration  with  the  SEC  of  securities  information 
processors.  Nonetheless, it  does give the SEC  broad rule-making power to 
remove impediments to, or perfect the mechanism of,  a national securities 
market  system  and  to  set  up,  in effect,  a composite quotation information 
device. Meanwhile, the SEC  has,  as  you  know, been moving ahead  in this 
area  under its  existing authority.  On  November  21,  1972,  it  received  a 
report from its  advisory committee on a composite quotation system.  The 
report  adopted  the  view  that  the  success  of  the  central  market  system 
would  be  dependent  upon quotations from  all  sources  appearing  in one 
central  location.  Therefore,  there  should  be  but one composite quotation 
system,  instead  of  a  number  of  competing  systems.  In  addition,  the 
advisory  committee  suggested  that  the  proposed  system  should  be  used 328  W.  H.  PaintN,  D.  M.  Feuerstein,  R.  M.  Newman,  B.  r.  Tague 
only  by  responsible  market  makers,  namely,  fX'?ple  wh.o  stand  rp~dy to 
make a bona fide,  continuous, two-sided market In  a partICular securrty for 
a  specified  minimum  period.  In  addition,  a  market  maker  would  not  be 
permitted to drop out of the system and return  to  it  ?t  will:  To ensure .that 
the  system  would  be  adequately  regulated,  the  SEC s advIsory  committee 
suggested that it  be administered by the same central processor that would 
oversee the operation of the composite tape. One member of the committee, 
who I believe is here today, dissented on the ground that to require a single 
composite quotation system  would be  to establish a monopoly, and might 
well  subject  users  to  the  imposition  of  restrictions  by  special  interests 
foreclosing the development of new and competing systems, and unnecessar_ 
ily  concentrate power in  the  hands  of  one group.  That  WdS  in  1972. 
More  recently,  the  SEC  reissued a revision  of its  proposed  Rule  17a-14 
which gives the stock exchanges and the  NASD  until February,! 1975, to 
submit proposals for operating a composite quotation system.  In  the release 
accompanying the  proposed  Rule  17a-14 revision,  the commission staled 
that it appears "appropriate" to effect the centralization of all  quotations in 
listed securities, and that "to a significant degree" a uniformity of approach 
to the development of a composite quotation system  will  be  necessary.  To 
ensure the comprehensiveness  of quotations disseminated pursuant to an 
effective  plan,  the  revised  rule  would  provide  that  after  a plan  has  been 
declared  effective  and  has  become  operational,  no  person  (including a 
market  maker  or  specialist)  may  communicate  market  makers'  or 
specialists'  quotations  in  listed  securities  otherwise  than  in  accordance 
with the  provisions of the  plan.  However,  the  rule  would not  impose any 
minimum  market-making  obligations  on  specialists  or  market  makers; 
neither  would  it  foreclose  the  possibility  of  a  separate  quotation  system 
such  as  NASDAQ  being  established  by  the  NASD  for  over-the-counter 
securities and, to some extent,  NYSE-listed securities; nor would it  prevent 
the establishment by the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges of a 
composite  quotation  system  for  listed  securities.  The  Securities  Industry 
Automation Corporation (SIAC), a jointly owned data processing subsidiary of 
the  New York and American stock exchanges, and NASDAQ,  the NASD's 
automated  quotation  system  for  over-the-counter  securities  have  each 
sought to obtain the exclusive right to establish and maintain the composite 
quotation  system. 
Two  other  recent  developments  have  been  the  New  York  Stock  Ex-
change's proposal to modify,  perhaps liberalize,  Rule  394 to simplify and 
~xpedite the requirements  for  New  York  Stock  Exchange  members  wish-
109 to trade  NYSE-listed  securities elsewhere than on the (Ioor of the stock 
exchange. As to composite quotations, the president of the New York Stock 
Exchange  recently  indicated  that  he  was  considering  a  "compromise," 
whereby the  New York Stock Exchange would agree to give regional stock • 
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exchanges access to price quotations presently available only to  members 
of  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  if  the  SEC  would  agree,  in  turn,  to 
postpone  its  May  1,  1975,  deadline  for  the  implempntati,m  of  fully 
negotiated  commission  rates.  As  Mr.  Needham  described  it,  the  SEC 
"would  let  us  continue on  with  fixed  rates  until  the  composite quotation 
system  and  a  national  clearing  and  settlement  system  were  in  place." 
Significantly,  he  failed  to  indicate  that  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange 
would  make  bid  and  asked  quotations  available  to  market  makers  of 
NYSE-listed  securities in  the  over-the-counter market-in other words  in 
the  third  market.  Indeed,  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  has,  for  s~me 
period  of  time,  been attempting to  persuade the SEC  and the Congress to 
eliminate the third  market  as  a quid pro quo for fully  negotiated rates and 
for the establishment of the proposed national securities market system.  In 
one way or another, the issues of composite quotations and competitively 
determined  rates  have  become interwoven  with  one another,  as  well  as 
with  the  issue  of  the  viability  of  the  third  market  and  of  regional  stock 
exchanges.  It  is, of course, the impact of the proposed composite quotation 
system  upon  the  regiona I stock exchanges which  is  the subject of today's 
panel. 
FEUERSTEIN:  It  has  been  stated  that  the  composite  tape  is  only  a 
record of past history. That problem may also afflict this panel. Many of the 
things that we should be talking about have already been discussed. There 
is,  in fact,  I think general consensus among those who ha'Je spoken that in 
order for  the  regional  stock  ex::hanges to  survive in  an  era of  negotiated 
commission  rates,  when  gimmickry will  no  longer  be possible,  they will 
have to have substantial market-making capabilities. In order for either their 
existing market  makers to develop those capabilities, or for  them to  attract 
new market makers who will have those capabi lities, the regionals must have 
an ability effectively to advertise their activities. This means they must have a 
comp05itequotation system, since, as I said, the composite tape provides only 
a record  of  past history.  In  addition,  many participants in  the  markets are 
either unable or unwilling to seek best execution because it is not economical 
for them to do so, because it is not convenient for them to do so, or because 
they  have other reasons  not to  do so.  Thus,  in  addition to the composite 
quotation system, there will  have to be some means found to force people to 
seek  the  best  execution  indicated on  the  system. 
That  leaves  little  to  talk  about with  regard  to  the  composite quotation 
system, except the issue of whether it would be better to  have the hundred 
million  dollar  composite  quotation  system  suggested  by  the  New  York 
Stock Exchange or the much less expensive modification of NASDAQ.  The 
latter would enable us  to go  about our other business much more expedi-
tiously. The system suggested by the New York  Stock Exchange, which we 
cannot afford,  unfortunately,  would  take  many  years  to  develop,  forcing 
>  c  ~.  - • 
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everything else to be delayed in  the me~ntime. Rath.er than ad.dressing that 
uestion  I would  like to address a question that I thlllk underlies the entire 
~sue of ;he cornposite quotation syst(lm and, indeed, thE'  whnle concept uf 
competitive market  makers. 
We  have  today  a  specialist system;  and  the  essence of that  specialist 
system,  in  my  opinion,  is  subsidy,  a subsidy  o.f. illactive stocks  by active 
stocks. There certainly is  no  reason why competition would not result in an 
excellent market in American Telephone common stock. It,  in fact, does in 
American Express common stock.  But not all of the stocks listed on the New 
York Stock  Exchange are active stocks.  Indeed, perhaps only 20 percent of 
them are. Therefore, we have a large number of inactive stocks Which, at least 
according to  the traditional theory, have to  be subsidized, that is,  We  must 
have affirmative regulation to require a specialist to  make a better market in 
those stocks than he would make in his own economic best interest.  In order 
to have the carrol to induce him to do so, we give him a franchise in the active 
stock.  Therefore,  in  Bob  Newman's case,  in  order to  get the franchise  in 
Fannie Mae common stock he also makes a market in Kirsch, which may bea 
very fine company, but not a company that has very active investor interest. 
The question then asked by the theory is whether if Bob Newman no longer has 
a monopoly franchise in Fannie Mae, he would still be willing to make J better 
market  than  would  be economically called  for  in  Kirsch?  I think  this  is  a 
question that is necessarily posed by the composite quotation system and by the  I:' 
larger issue of competing market makers. Unless the SEC or some other national 
agency is going to set up uniform books of stocks throughout the s~'stem, so that  ~ 
anybody who makes a market in  Fannie Mae also has to  make a market in  f' 
Kirsch, the operation of Gresham's law will then necessarily lead to the refusal  il' 
of Fannie Mae market makers to make a market in Kirsch. They will say to their  9-
own market center, "If you force me to make a market in Kirsch, and I do not  !< 
have to do  it  in  some other market center,  I'll  simply move my  Fannie  Mae 
activities  there." 
This  leads to some important questions that I think  should be addressed. 
First,  why  is  it that  Kirsch  has to  be subsidized? There are certainly a large  is  i 
number of  stocks,  presently unlisted,  that  have  trading characteristics not 
superior to  Kirsch,  but yet  have  a  number  of very  active  and  interested  Ip 
market makers. I suggest to  you  that the reason  Kirsch  has to be subsidized  2:e 
is  because  the auction  market  mechanism,  which  is  very  important  and 
very  useful  for  active stocks,  is  a luxury that  perhaps we cannot afiord  for  (0 
inactive stocks.  In an  inactive stock, a large percentage of the volume must  t'd 
necessarily be  that of the dealer.  If the dealer has to  print all  his  trades on  It 
the tape, he will  be disclosing his position  to  those who may trade against  r~ 
hi~, .and  increase  the  risk  to  himself of taking that  position.  Second,  the  Ca 
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spreads. The  auction system  is supposed to  result  in  the meeting of  public 
orders  directly,  whenever  they  can  do  so,  without  the  market  maker's 
skimming off a riskless  principal spread. That, of course, also is a very good 
idea,  but  it  necessari Iy  reduces the  profitability of the security  to a dealer. 
So  we  must  ask whether the composite quotation system and competitive 
market  making will  prevent us  from  subsidizing the 80  percent,  or  what-
ever the  number is,  of listed  stocks that are  presently subsidized  because 
they  are  inactive;  whether,  if  they  are  delisted,  they  will  have  a  better 
market  or  a  worse  market. 
I think there  is  another question that has to  be  addressed. The specialist 
is  not  an  eleemosynary institution.  If  he  is  making a better market than he 
would  like  in  Kirsch,  and therefore not  making the  return  he would like all 
his  capital  or  perhaps  even  losing  money,  he  must  make  up  his  loss 
somewhere else.  Theoretically, and presumably, he is  making it up on his 
market  in  Fannie Mae.  He  is taking more out of that market than  competi-
tion  would  allow him  to.  Therefore,  we  must  then ask:  Who has decided 
that  the  shareholders of  Fannie  Mae  should  subsidize the shareholders of 
Kirsch?  is this in the national interest? If it  is  in  the national interest, who is 
administering  the  subsidy;  who  has  decided  how  much  it  should  be?  I 
think all  these are  questions that  we  have  to  address and  face  before  we 
can  go  forward  on  the  mechanics,  the  nuts  and  bolts  of  a  composite 
quotation  system. 
NEWMAN:  I  could  spend  a  lot  of  time  defending  the  role  of  the 
specialist on the floor  of the  New York  Stock  Exchange,  but that  is  not our 
purpose today. It would appear that we  are gradually, but steadily, moving 
toward  the  reality of a central marketplace. There are many problems that 
surface,  and the  issues that  surround  the  problems  are  many-faceted.  To 
say the  least,  many  are  controversial. One of these areas is  the  composite 
quotation  system.  If  we  have  a  central  market  as  the  final  result  of 
deliberations  by  the  SEC,  the  Congress,  the  industry,  and  the  Justice 
Department,  then  there must  be access to that market. A quotation system 
is  necessary  to  achieve  that  result. 
My  views  are  based  solely  on  practical  experience as  a  member,  for 
approximately  eight  years,  of the  professional  trading  community.  There 
are a number of  points in  the  form  of questions that  I will  ask,  because I 
won't presume to  describe to  anybody  in  this  room  what  the results of a 
composite  quotation  system  will  ·be.  Among  the  topics  that  should  be 
examined are more equal regulation and open access. By equal regulation, 
I do  110t  refer  just  to  regulation  among  market  makers;  I  include  the 
regulation  that  affects  all  the  parties  who  have  access  to  the  machine. 
Capital  requirements:  I know the  SEC  is  working on a uniform capital rule 
now.  Competitive rates:  Are  they  going to  be  posted or  not posted? There •  I 
332  W.  H.  Painter,  D.  M.  Feuerstein,  R.  M.  Newman,  B.  E.  Tague 
are some  institutional  people who  would like  rates,  ('VPn  though  they are 
fully  competitive,  to  be  posted  by  the various  member  firms  of  the  New 
York  Stock  [xchange.  . 
The availability of specialists, capital, and market-making talent is a very 
important  subject.  There  are  a  great  many  pt'ople  in  the  professional 
trading community who are concerned about the lack of e~o~?h qualified 
market-making talent  in  this country to assume the respons,bil,ty that  new 
methods call  for.  Surveillance:  Will  there be adequate surveillance when 
you  have  a  composite  quotation  system?  A~ it  now  s~~nds, the  systems 
that  are  being  developed  do  not  have  real-tIme  capabIlIty adequately to 
survey  what  is  happening  now.  Similar  to  the  composite  tape,  these 
systems  report  primarily  what  has  happened,  not  what  is  happening. 
The  impact  on  regional  exchanges  is  something that  I cannot begin  to 
answer.  Will  open  competitiveness  force  the  regional  exchanges out of 
business, or will  advertising of quotes in  a competitive quote system do so? 
I cannot tell  you  whether quotations  will  help or hinder the  regional  stock 
exchanges or the third market.  Only time will  answer these questions. The 
impact of the best execution-i.e., the switching of orders by member firms 
to  where the best quote is  displayed-all these are knotty problems.  They 
are  problems  on  which  I cannot presume  to  make  judgments as  to  what 
will  happen.  I just  want  to  make  everybody  aware  that  these  questions 
exist, that they are serious, and that they should not be disposed of lightly. 
TAGUE:  We  have  before  us  today  proposed  Rule  J 7  a-14.  As  I read  it, 
17a-14  requires  the  exchanges  and  associations  whose  members  make 
markets  in  securities registered  on  national  securities exchanges to  estab-
lish  a  plan  to  make  quotations  available  on  a  real-time  basis,  through 
authorized quotation vendors,  by  february  1,  1975.  Don  Calvin  and  Bob 
Newman  have  raised  some very  interesting questions and points.  I also do 
not  know  what the advent  of composite quotations will  do  to  the  market 
system.  However,  I would  like  to  take  this  opportunity to  trace  a  bit  of 
history  with  you.  I  feel  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  we  move  toward 
complying,  unilaterally, with  17a-14,  and propose  plans to  the  Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission  for  implementing  a  composite quotation  sys-
tem.  I think  it  is  essential,  and I think  a  look  at  history  will  tell  us  why. 
Some  years  ago  a  substantial  monopoly developed  for  the  major stock 
exchanges in this country. The product of this monopoly became excessive 
commission rates.  Since fixed  commissions rendered effective competition 
inconsequential  by  edict,  the  only  event  which  mitigated  against  a total 
monopoly  developing  was  the  commission's  multiple  trading  case  deci-
sion.  No  reliable gauge or competitive force otherwise would have existed 
for  judging the  fairness  of fixed  minimum brokerage commission  rales  by 
the SEC.  Activity in  the marketplace was primarily generated by the public 
customer who  individually failed  to  command  much  attention.  Addition-
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ally,  the  fifties  and  early  sixties  were  characterized  by  good  markets; 
generally  everybody  was  making  money;  the  social  atmosphere  was  re-
st'rved;  people were content and generally happy;  and consequently, if the 
exchange asked for a rate  increase, the SEC granted it.  A second condition 
prevalent during those years was an almost total  market-making monopoly 
for specialists on the major stock exchanges, where over 90  percent of the 
volume  in  listed  securities  took  place. 
Regional  stock  exchanges  proved  poor  competitors  for  a  number  of 
reasons:  (1)  Many  rules,  and  even  more  importantly,  implicit  pressures 
were brought to  bear upon regional firms  by  major exchanges, resulting in 
the  regional  firms  bypassing  regional  for  New  York  market  centers.  The 
main argument centered around a term called "fragmentation." This was a 
Madison  Avenue  expression  which  supposedly  referred  to  a  splintered, 
auction  market process,  to the detriment of the public.  (2)  Regional  stock 
exchanges,  and  regional  specialist  units  particularly,  lacked  capital,  the 
capacity, and to a great extent, the  expertise to compete effectively against 
the  major  stock  exchanges. 
These  monopolies, coupled with  the exponential increase of institutional 
activity  in  the  stock  market,  finally  gave rise  to  competitive alternatives. 
Some  of  these  resulted  in  the  development  of  another  Madison  Avenue 
catchword-·"gimmick."  One of the  most  common gimmicks was  some-
thing commonly called reciprocity, for  in effect, the practice of discounting 
commissions  in  manifold  ways developed. Why?  Because the commission 
rate  structure  was  excessive,  and  every  broker  on  Wall  Street  and 
elsewhere  knew  it.  This  was  an  example of  industry self-regulation at  its 
worst.  Today  all  exchanges  have  been forced  to  institute  "nonmember 
access."  It  is  the  same  thing  as  reciprocity-only  the  name  has  been 
changed to protect the image. Another so-called gimmick developed when 
certain  "maverick" exchanges allowed institutions-those giants  with  bil-
lions  who  heretofore  had  been  victims  of  one of  history's  most  massive 
rip-offs-to become members and thereby save their pensioners and their 
policyholders millions yearly,  to the detriment of the brokerage industry.  I 
submit to you that had our industry not been so greedy, Mayday (May 1, 1975) 
probably would not be facing us with its ominous implications today. Public 
awareness, basic fundamental competitive economics, and time have a very 
curious way of dealing with malpractice, and that is exactly what our industry 
was  guilty·  of  at  one  time. 
As  far  as  the  market-making  process  is  concerned,  the  rise  of  viable 
regional  specialists,  the  third  market,  and the  fourth  market  became obvi-
ous  and  natural  as  both  nonmember  brokers  and  institutions  opted  for 
relief from excessive commissions. This created additional inquiry in  other 
market  centers,  and  with  the  additional  inquiry  developed  additional 
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market  concept  administered  by  d  sONialist  with  an  exclusive  (ralllhisc' 
was confronted with  an  additional ingredient rhf'  ri<;c'  of viable.  ('({Pttive, 
competitive  market  makers  in  multiple  market  c('nters. 
About four  yeilrs ago we arrived at  a point wnere the SEC  became firmly 
convinced  that  instituting  a  central  market  system  and,  ultimately,  iullv 
competitive  rates  was  the  only  way  to  resolve  the  gross  inconSistencies 
which  occurred  within  our  industry.  In  other  words,  let  free  competition 
across  the  bOilrd  accomplish  what  the  industry  refused  to  accomplish 
through self-regulation.  Noll' that I see the central market system as coming 
before  fully  competitive  rates.  That  I think  is  key.  Perhaps the  interest  in 
stock exchange membership which developed among all  types  of  private 
and public institutions had something to do with  il;  I cannot say for  sure. 
Three  years ago we finally sat down as an industry, and for  the  first time 
in  history altempted to  identify and resolve issues relative to the creation of 
a central market  system.  It  was  qUickly  determined that a combined tape, 
which reported transactions as they occurred in  the vilrious milrket centers, 
was  the  easiest  thing  to  implement  and,  therefore,  was  the  obvious  first 
step.  The  composite  tape  was  operationally  feasible  within  a  matter  of 
weeks,  we  were  told.  It  simply  reported  transactions  as  they  occurred, 
identifying  market  location.  All  this  was  desirable  frolll  the  standpoint of 
providing increased E'Xposure and more complete disclosure to  the invest. 
ing  public.  After  developing  tape  prototypes  A,  B,  C,  and  0,  with  their 
manifold  ramifications,  a  funny  thing  happened on  the  way  to  the  first 
print.  A new  catch  phrase  emerged  called  "equal  regulation." 
In  the months  and reams of memorandums which followed,  covering a 
virtual  kaleidoscope  of  rules  and  regulations,  the  only  thing  that  was 
agreed upon was that confusion reigned.  Regional exchanges and the third 
market qUickly agreed that the rules on short selling required equalization, 
but  v  ... ere  hard  pressed  to  understand  what  else.  The  major  exch?nges 
frequently  reminded  us  of our responsibility to  maintain  the public's trust 
and  confidence.  50  what  happened?  After  almost  four  years  of  finally 
putting  together a combined tape,  we  are today displaying  fifteen  stocks. 
The regulation that was equalized was a short-selling rule, period. With all the 
tech~ology we  were  told  was  required,  trade  information  for  the  new 
composite  tape  has  been  transmitted  initially by  the  good  old-fashioned 
teletypewriter, and inputs  to  the tape have been handled manually. That is 
progress for you. The 51AC people themselves have conceded that we could 
have accomplished this three months after the initial discussions. Were it not 
for  the  fact  that  the  SEC  finally  banged  the  gavel,  Ihere  would  be  no 
composite tape today. 
That  brings  me  up  to  the  present.  Today  I am  hearing  that  because of 
technological problems we are going to have to wait six more months or so 
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the  impact of composite quotations on regional  market centers.  I think it 
would be  more appropriate for my six  year old son  to discuss the  subject 
some  years  hence,  if experience  follows  true  to  form. 
I  do  not  mean  to  be  too  satirical  here  today,  but  I  am  honestly 
concerned.  I  sincerely  believe,  and  here  I  agree  with  the  major  stock 
exchanges,  that the advent of unfixed commissions, if implemented before 
more  of  a  central  market  system  is  in  place-i.e.,  before  composite 
quotations  are  available-will, in  time,  probably eliminate the  need  for  a 
stock  exchange  system  as  we  have  known  it.  That  would  be  a  shame. 
Despite its inconsistencies, the system is displayed for all the world to view 
constructive capitalism at  its  best.  In  my view, because the central market 
system  has  been  bound in red  tape, the  SEC  has  now reversed  its original 
priorities  by  putting  competitive  commissions  ahead  of  a  competitive 
system.  This,  I  believe,  exposes  smaller  regional  brokers,  as  well  as 
regional stock exchanges  initially and the major stock exchanges  later on, 
to  unnecessary  risks. 
We read  about how multiple dealer markets are being planned and are 
about  to  be  unveiled.  Only the  strongest  firms  can  feel  assured  of their 
survival  in such an  atmosphere.  We have living proof withm our industry 
today  of who benefits  most  from  fully  negotiated  commissions  and who 
benefits most from a composite tape.  It is  a big versus small issue.  While I 
distinctly respect the  job that Weiss, Peck  & Greer, and other very capable 
New  York  Stock  Exchange  specialist  firms  do,  their  competition  in  the 
future  probably  will  not  come  from  me.  It  will  come  from  Salomon 
Brothers;  Goldman,  Sachs;  and Merrill  Lynch.  It  will  be  concentrated;  it 
will be well financed; and it will be tough. I am sure you have considered 
that, Bob. Only the strong and the well capitalized are going to survive and 
remain  viable,  and  perhaps  that  is  the  way  it  should  be. 
However,  I  have  a responsibility as  chairman  of the PBW  Exchange  to 
help  protect  the  smaller,  well-managed  broker-dealer,  the  regional  firms 
who make  up the backbone of our membership, and without whom the 
capitalistic system will be a lot weaker. So,  when we talk about the impact 
of  composite  quotations,  I  am  worried  that  with  negotiated  rates  the 
exchange  system  might  become  so  weakened  that  by  the  time  we  get 
around to agreeing on a system,  the  only remaining participants in  it will 
be  the  giants.  As  to  the  technology,  I  believe  it  can  be  accomplished 
quickly.  Recently I  have been  impressed  with the  circumspection  shown 
by  the  staff  of the  major  exchanges.  I  left  a  meeting  in  New York  two 
weeks ago where, as  Bill Painter reported, there was a move on  the part of 
the New York Stock Exchange to change their position. I think they see that 
their  position  in opposition to unfixed commissions and  in  opposition to 
17a-14 are  inconsistent.  I know the  pressures to which Jim  Needham and 
Paul  Kolton and  Don Calvin are exposed.  I know how opposed the floors 336  W.  H.  Painter,  D.  M.  Fl'ut'rstein,  R.  M.  Newman,  B.  E.  Tagup 
of  the  major  stock  exchanges are  to  the ?issemination .of  their  quotes.  I 
know how they feel  about regional specialists and the third markets laying 
off positions in their markets. I know .how .they feei  about the  regio~~fs and 
the third  market utilizing their quotatIons  In an effort to be competlfrve. All 
I can  suggest  to  them  are  two things:  (1)  that  the  competition  between  us 
will  eliminate  many  of  these  problems  that  are  sUpposedly  posed  by 
unequal  regulation;  and  (2)  it  is  better. to  have  60  to  70  percent  of 
something rather than 100 percent of nothing.  It  appears to  me that for the 
first  time  there  is  a sense of urgency to  negotiate  in  good faith.  I hope the 
SEC  accepts  this  sincerity,  and I hope  it  forestalls  the  implementation of 
unfixed  rates.  I  feel  the  guts  of  a  central  market  system  can  be  in 
place-and that  means composite quotations-and in  good  working  order 
within  a  year  if  we  approach  it  diligently. 
What  is  the  impact  of  composite  quotations  on  the  regional  market-
places? Simply this.  The viable,  professional units will  receive an exposure 
they  never  before  realized,  and in  such  an atmosphere they  will  become 
even  more  proficient  and  more  competitive.  The  other  specialists  and 
market makers simply will  not  make it. Their inability to respond positively 
in  a truly  competitive  market  climate will  in  time  render them  obsolete. 
The  choice  will  be  theirs;  they  will  not  simply  be  rendered obsolete  by 
decree.  In  my  opinion, obsolescence appears to  be their future destiny.  If 
the  SEC's  timetable  remains  unchanged,  I feel  that  it  is  likely  that  many 
more  will  fall  as  well-and that  would  be  a  shame. 
These days everybody is wondering how to get the  public back into the 
market.  The  elimination  of  the  bear  market,  of  course,  is  highly  recom-
mended.  A  united,  consistent  securities  industry,  which  discloses  and 
exposes market  information for  everyone to see,  an  industry which  prices 
its  products  and  services  fairly  and  competitively,  obviously  will  help 
considerably.  The  evolution of a truly  competitive central market  system, 
followed  by the unfixing of commissions,  is the way to  proceed. My  hope 
is  that  this  industry will  get  together now  and dedicate itself to  that end, 
because the  real  danger lies,  in  my opinion,  in  putting  the  cart before the  horse. 
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Seymour  Smidt 
Corm·1J  University 
Philip  A.  l.oomi5  Jr. 
US.  Securities  and Exchange  Commission 
Thomas  J.  Lewis 
losepthal  and Comoany,  Inc. 
Charlt's  E.  Rickershauser  Jr. 
Munger,  Tolles,  Hills  &  Rickershauser 
Donald  E.  Weeden 
Weeden  and Company,  Inc. 
Richard  R.  West 
University  of Oregon 
John  A.  McQuown 
Independent  financial  consultant 
Donald  E.  Farrar 
University  of California,  Los  Angeles 
lv10rris  Mendelson 
Universily  of Pennsylvania 
William  D.  Ireland 
Bank  of America 
John  A.  Hewitt 
C1Jase  Manhattan  Bank 
HELl.ER:  Don,  your concept of subsidy  interests  me.  let me ask  you  a 
question. If the Fannie Mae shareholder is subsidizing the Kirsch sharehold-
er because of the market system, since the Fannie Mae shareholder may, 
at his election, sell  the stock and stop the subsidy, is  your question valid? 
FEUERSTEIN:  Certainly, because, first of all, the Fannie Mae shareholder 
is  not assuming that the theory is  valid, that he is  not getting the full  value 
of his security when he sells. Second, although the Fannie Mae shareholder 
is free to sell-that argument goes to a lot  of things that we do not allow to 
happen in  our system--we must realize that shareholders and corporations 
still  are,  to  some extent, captives. I think,  thirdly,  it  is  a question of where 
the burden of  prof)f is.  It  seems to me that we start in  our society with a 
proposition that natural  market forces  rather than subsidies should deter-
mine the allocation of  resources. The question really  is  then, What is  the 
justification for the subsidy? not What is  the justification for  not having it? 
RATNER:  I  have  been  impressed  by  the  realistic  approaches  of  the 
speakers,  but  disappointed  by  some  of  the  Madison  Avenue  phrases, 
principally in  use of the term "central market system." We have had in the 
past,  for some time now, not one but two central market facilities. One is 
the New York Stock Exchange and the other is  NASDAQ. The approach at 338  W.  H.  Painter,  D.  M.  Feuers!pin,  R.  M.  Newman,  B.  E.  Tague  -
the moment is that, somehow, these two can be combined; that two totally 
different  approaches  to  creating  a  central  market  can  be  put  together, 
combining  mmretitivf'  m;uket  m:!kers  with  priority'  for  public  orders.  I 
wonder whether this is realistic. Were we misled hr' the fact that there are 
now competing  market  makt'rs  in  listed  stocks?  Those  competing  market 
makers  have,  in  effect,  been  subsidized.  As  Don  Feuerstein  pointed  out, 
one of the  subsidies  involves active stocks  subsidizing inactive ones;  bUI 
block  positioning  by  member  firms  also  has  been  subSidized,  by  fixed 
commission  rates.  The  third  market,  while it has not been  subsidized, has 
been  operating within the  parameters  of a fixed  commission  rate  system. 
The regional exchanges have been able to operate within those parameters 
by  offering access  to  people who could not get economic access  to  New 
York.  Have  we  been  deluding  ourselves  by  thinking  that,  in  a  fully 
competitive era,  we could really have a market that combines auction and 
dealer  features?  Has  such  a market ever  eXisted?  Is  there  any  reason  to 
believe it will? If not, then we are faced with an  important choice which is, 
if it has to be either ~he New York Stock Exchange or a dealer-type market, 
are there demonstrable advantages to  the  stock exchange type sufficient to 
warrant the  government's taking affirmative action  to  preserve  it?  Do we 
have any  hard  evidence as  to  which type of market-in equivalent stock 
issues--serves  public investors  better? 
TAGUE:  Dave,  I  think  that  you  have  in  existence  today,  on  the  New 
York Stock Exchange and, to an  obviously smaller extent, on other regional 
stock  exchanges,  a combination  of the  auction  and  dealer  processes.  I 
think  some  combination  of these  two  processes  is  the  most  desirable.  I 
would hate to  see  the  los5  of the auction market, and  I would hate to  see 
the  elimination of the  inputs that dealers  can  make  in  helping to  provide 
depth  and  liquidity that  would  not exist  in  their  absence.  I do think that 
Don makes some  very interesting points.  I worry about the  consequences, 
if you move in this direction, of it suddenly not being feasible for my  firm 
to  have  a Specialist  book in  over forty-five  stocks.  If it  does  not become 
infeaSible,  it certainly becomes difficult to manage, difficult to finance, and 
there  will be a tendency for us  to concentrate on  only the most Significant 
issues.  I do think that some combination of the auction and dealer process 
is  the  way  this  thing  should  evolve. 
FEUERSTEIN:  Dave,  I do not think we  want to  get  tied  up in semantics 
here,  which  is  one  of the  problems  that  frequently  arises  when  we  talk 
about  the  so-called  auction  versus  dealer  market  After  all  an  auction 
market is  simply one in  which there is a mechanis~ to insure'that the best 
bid and  the  best offer always are filled. The opposite of that is a negotiated 
market in which there are private transactions without regard to other bids 
or  o~ers in. the  system.  A dealer market,  if there  is  any definition for it,  is 
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from  an  agency  market  in  which  public  orders  mllst  go  through  brokers. 
There  is  some  experience as  to  whethpr these things  are  compatible.  For 
example, we do know that with  regard to a noncontinuous duction market 
a call market,  it  is perfectly possible to have an  auction-dealer market. Tha; 
:s  what  competitive  bidding  is  for  a  new  utility  issue,  and  that  is  what 
happens every  time  the  Treasury ductions  off  Treasury  bills.  That  is  both  a 
dealer  market  and  all  auction  market.  The  question  is  whether  you  can 
have a continuous market that also  is  a dealer market, and I frankly  do  not 
see  any  reason  why  you  cannot. 
RATNER:  My  question  really was whether you  can  have a market  with 
fully  competing dealers plus  priority  for  public orders and reporting of all 
transactions. 
SMIDT:  I think  if you  go  to  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  you 
will  see  that  marl  ... et.  I am  not  ~aying it  will  apply  to  every  stock;  yet  as  a 
theoretical  possibility  it  is  an  excellent  one. 
NEWMAN:  As a theoretical possibility,  it  is definitely possible for  that to 
evolve  after  d  central  market  has  been  implemented.  All  the  theory  you 
want  to  talk  about today,  however,  is  not going to  take  us  to that  point. 
I  disagree  with  my  colleague  here  about  the  implementation  of 
negotiated rates.  My  personal belief is  that they should be implemented as 
soon  as  possible;  we  should  get  on  with  it.  Let's  find  out  what  will  be 
needed to survive  in  this  marketplace.  I recognize that there definitely are 
some  problems in getting to  negotiated rates by May  1;  but it  is inevitable, 
and  the  faster  it  happens  the  better  it  will  be  for  all  of  us.  We  will  learn 
how to survive.  Whether the market that evolves will  be a combination of 
auction  and  dealer  markets  I don't  know,  but  let's  find  out. 
FEUERSTEIN:  I think  there  is  another point that  should  be  mentioned. 
Sometimes the rational and idealistic way oi proceeding is  not the practical 
way  of  proceeding.  I think  vve  probably all  could  agree  that  if  you  had  to 
sit  down  and  write  out the  ideal scenario for  moving  from  wherf~ we  are 
now  to  where most  people think we  should go,  the first  step would  not  be 
competitively determined commission  rates.  I think  you  have to examine 
the  question  in  the  context of history.  After  all,  it  was  only  in  1968,  six 
years  ago,  that the  SEC  first  began seriously to  consider unfixed rates.  The 
basic components of the central market system were first considered in  the 
fall  of  1970,  only  four  years  ago,  during  the  course  of  the  Institutional 
Investor  StuJy.  Unfortunately,  we  have  a  situation  where,  because  the 
securities industry is such a heterogeneous industry,  it  has been difficult,  if 
not  impossible, to  reach  progressive consensus among the members of the 
industry without a crisis. Although the ideal way of proceeding might be to 
implement competitive rates  last,  the only way to  reach our goal  may  be 
by  way  of  the  old  Chinese  proverb,  "One  step  backward,  two  steps 
forward." 340  W.  H.  Painler,  D.  M.  ft'lIl'fstpin,  R.  M.  NC'wman.  B.  E.  Tague  -- LOOMIS:  I would  like  to  give  my  viewpoint  as  10  what  Don  has  just 
said.  No  one  even  thought  of  a  central  markpt  system  until  they  were 
confronted with  the  possibility that fixed  rates might no  longer be present 
to  insulate the  old system.  We have s('en  an  accelerating rc1tp  of  progress 
for the central market system, although we are not there, primarily because 
people  have  concluded  that  they  have  to  do it..  '. 
LEWIS:  Has  any discussion come up,  or has anything been finalized  by 
the composite quotation committee or other appropriate body as to volume 
requi rements  for  participants,  i.e.,  as  to  the  size  of  their  market? 
PAINTER:  This raises the problem from  a practical standpoint. It is fine to 
have composite quotations; but if I look at  my composite quotation screen 
when  I  come  into  the  office  in  the  morning  and  see  a  better  price 
somewhere out in  Omaha, do I have a duty to  explore that price if I know 
there  is  no  size  behind  it-if I know  the  market  maker  is  not  Willing  to 
provide any depth at his quotation? For all  practical purposes I may end up 
with  a  specialist  on  the  floor  of  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange. 
TAGUE:  These are questions that  I think  everybody in  this  industry, and 
probably  every  institution  that  is  represented  here,  would  like  to  have 
answered.  It involves fidUCiary  responsibility.  Where does it  exist? When is 
it  required?  What  obligations  does  it  impose  on  a  broker?  I think  these 
questions  are  in  the  process  of being  answered,  and  some  of  the  legal 
minds  here  probably can  answer them  better than  I can.  As  far  as  I am 
concerned,  in  answer  to  Tom's  question,  there  is  not  any  composite 
quotation committee that I know of that has been discussing the depth and 
size  of  markets. 
RICKERSHAUSER:  In  trying to answer that question.  I think that.  first of 
all,  regarding  the  composite  tape,  there  are  meetings  going  on  at  the 
present time.  Concerning composite quotations,  however,  exploratory dis-
cussions  also  began  some  time  ago.  Because  of  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange's  opposition  to  any  such  system  and  its  written  position  that 
efforts  to  force  its  r.articipation  would  be  unconstitutional,  however,  it 
seemed  unwise  to  continue  to  expend  substantial  amounts  of  time  and 
energy  on  such  meetings. 
On your question, Bill, about whether or not one would feel obligated to 
go  to Omaha when  you  know they are good for  only a hundred shares,  I 
would like  to ask  people here what they are  doing in  the over-the-counter 
market  where  that  problem  presently  exists? 
LEWIS:  I only bring up  the question because I have  heard at  least seven 
times  that  there  is  a  deadline  of  February  I,  1975,  for  responding  to 
17a- 14.  Ho~ is  it  Possible  that  no  discussion  has  been  going  on  as  to 
volume  reqUIrements?  The  date  is  around  the  corner. 
.  HElLER:. Maybe  I can be helpful on this question.  I do not  believe there 
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the  central  market  advisory  committee  has  grappled  with  the  problem. 
What does best execution mean?  Does best execution require you to go to 
Omaha. Nebraska, or Keokuk,  lowel,  for  100 shares or 2UO shares? Alii can 
say  is,  I hope  there will  be  some resolution,  on  all  advisory  basis.  to  the 
SEC.  I am  not saying,  however,  that  you  will  see  it  by  February  1. 
WEEDEN:  We  already  have  the  combination  of  an  auction  and  dealer 
market  on  the  floor  of  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange.  It  is  imperfect 
because  it  does  not  allow  all  public  orders  to  come  down  and  be 
represented  with  the  kind  of  priority  and  precedence  you  want.  It  is 
imperfect because it does not  have all  the dealer element you want. But we 
do  have  one  combination  market,  and  as  I  understand,  the  proposed 
central  market  is  only  an  attempt  to  expand  and  improve  upon  that 
concept.  This  idea  that  we are  going to  something that makes  us  choose 
between  an  auction  and  a  dealer  market  is  rubbish. 
To  repeat,  we already have a central market system, although imperfect. 
All  you  instituti onal  traders  have  the  ability  to  search  through  the  com-
munication  systems that  have  been financed to  connect your offices  with 
those  of  brokers  and  dealers who are  market centers.  The  institutional  or 
professional  business has a central market. The problem is,  the public does 
not  have  a central market,  and the  broker who  is  representing the public 
does not  have a central market.  I understand that the purpose of our effort 
to create a central market system is to take something that we already have 
in  imperfect  form,  some  people  call  it  fragmented,  and  improve  it,  and 
provide  the  benefits  derived  from  those  improvemenb  to  the  public. 
Those  are  the two simple ideas. We already have them  in  place.  All  we 
have  to  do  is  use  communications  and  computer  technology  more 
efficiently  than  we  have  in  the  past.  The  problem  is  that  there  are  big 
economic interests  that  are  going  to  be  troubled  by  that change.  That  is 
where you  have the  problem, and that  is  where the uncertainty is  created 
artificially,  in  order to  create  confusion,  cloudiness,  and  therefore  post-
poneme~t. This  is  in  the  particular  interest  of  certain  elements  of  our 
industry,  about  which  I have  spoken  to  you  several  times  before. 
PAINTER:  Don, can I just clarify one point? Do  I assume then, from  your 
statement,  that  you  would  be  willing  to  be  bound  by  the  SEC's  two 
proposed  rules  regarding  the  priority  of  public  orders  and  precedence? 
WEEDEN:  I am glad you asked that question,  because I think that has to 
be  absolutely  clear.  No  one  I know  of  has  objected  to  the  concept  of 
priority  to  public  orders  and  precedence  to  limit  orders. 
PAINTER:  So  you  see that as  no obstacle to  integrating the third  market 
with  the  rest  of  the  central  market  system? 
WEEDEN:  If  we accept the concept of  subsidy-if only  because  there 
seems  to  be  lack  of  movement  away  from  it-then why  not  extend  the 
concept  to  all  stocks,  both  listed  and  unlisted?  Why  do  we  accept  the 342  VV.  H.  Painlt'r,  D.  M.  rl'LJ{'r~t{'in,  R.  M.  Newman,  B.  E.  Tague 
concept  oi  subsidy  only  for  listed  stocks,  and  why  isn't  the  conc~pt 
extpnded  of requiring  those  who receive  a  monopolv  position  in  active 
stocks  to  participate also  in  the  less  active  listed  staLk? 
A  second  question  is,  Wouldn't  it  be  useful  tor  Ihe  New  York  Stock 
Exchange  to  experiment  with  just  how  necessary  it  is  to  provide  this 
subsidy  in  order  to  achieve  continuous  market  making  in  "inactive 
stocks"? I vvould suggest a way of experimenting with that Proposition in a 
controlled test.  Ask  each onl' of the specialists to toss  into the hopper his 
least  interesting  and  potentially  least  profitable  stock.  Within  their  OWn 
membership see whether or not there is  someone who would step  forward 
and assume that responsibility  without having the  Fannie Mae's, but with 
the  privilege of obtaining  the  brokerage  commission  from  the  book.  You 
might even  extend  the  experiment  to other groups of stocks,  where  YOU 
expose  those stocks to  market  making by any member firm who wishes to 
assume  the  same  kind  of  responsibilities  in  those  stocks  that  they  do  in 
over-the-counter stocks.  In  many cases,  these are even  less  interesting from 
the  market  maker's  profit  standpoint. 
FEUERSTEIN:  Don found some questions in one of my statements. I must 
say  that  I could  not  find any addressed  to  me in  his.  beyond  rhetorical 
ones.  Unfortunately  or  fortunately,  as  the  case  may  be,  I  have  spent 
enough  time  with  economi~ts to  come  to  believe  that  subsidy,  in  my 
vocabulary,  is  a dirty  word. 
WEST:  I  interpreted  Mr.  Feuerstein's  discussion,  when  he  wa~ at  the 
microphone,  as  suggesting  that  the  argument regarding subsidies  is  made 
by advocates of fixed commission rates.  But the fact is that no such  subSidy 
exists;  so  I did not understand that Mr. Feuerstei n \  .... as  supporting the  view 
that  this  argument was valid.  I would like to ask  the follO\\'ing question of 
the  people at  the  conference  who '.'vrote  the Institutional  !nvestor  Study, 
You  looked at  the behavior of specialists in individual stocks.  Did you nnd 
that profit rates  for making markets in inactive stocks or slow-trading issues 
v  .. 'ere  lower than  in  active  stocks? 
SMIDT:  I  will  put  on  my  objective  hat.  We  found  clear evidence,  in 
high-volume  stocks,  that  there  were  monopolistic  returns.  There  were 
higher returns  than  would be necessary,  assuming free entry,  for someone 
to  reasonably  take  on  the  accompanying  risks.  Now at  the  other end,  I 
would say we did not find any evidence that vvould either support or reject 
the argument as  to subsidies. You can  look at the stocks, but to analyze the 
subsidy  argument carefully one vvou!d  have to compare the quality of the 
market versus the level of return across  stocks  in a finer \  .... a~' than we were 
able  to  in  the  study. 
~  would like now to go beyond the conclusions that could be supported 
:trJ~tly from  the  data.  I  think  there  are  some  questions  about economic 
logiC  that  are  relevant  here.  Would it be  re2sonable  for a  market maker, 
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under  the  circumstances we  found,  to  subsidize one stock  from  another? 
The argument presumably would be,  unless you made a beiter market than 
was  economic  in  a  low-volume  stock,  you  would  be  penalized  in  some 
way  by  not  having  better stocks  assigned  to  you.  Now,  we  did  not  find 
evidence that  those  responsible  for  stock  assignment  moved  stocks  from 
one  specialist  to  another.  That  would  indicate  to  me  that  no  specialist 
needed to fear that active stocks would be taken away from  him and given 
to somebody else because he  was not doing well enough in  his  less active 
stocks. I would have to qualify that.  I do not mean to imply that a specialist 
could  get  away with  grossly  inadequate performance. There may  be some 
set of conventions as to what  is good enough that we would not have been 
able to observe  in  the study.  But  from  the evidence that  is  available,  I am 
very  skeptical  as  to  whether  there  are  subsidies-but  I cannot  tell  for 
certain. 
NEWMAN:  The  New  York  Stock  Exchange  is  very  much  remiss  in  its 
allocation  and  reallocation of securities among bad  specialists.  However, 
there  is  some hope  on  the  floor  these days  among some of the  younger 
specialists that the  new committee that  is  headed  by  Mr.  Batten  IWiliiam 
M.  Batten,  chairman of  .1.  C.  Penney Company and a director of  NYSEl  will 
look  into  the  allocation and  reallocation process.  It  is  hoped that some of 
the  problems  that  exist  and  are  complained  about  vociferollsly  by  the 
legislative  and  supervisory  bodies and  the  institutional  investor  group  will 
be  dealt  with. 
McQUOWN:  I  would  like  to  ask  one  question.  What  is  the  return 
on  investment,  risk  adjusted,  to  the  specialist? 
SMIDT:  I have  it  readily available only for  the  most  active stocks,  and 
only  for  the  period  of an  obviously  better market  that we studied.  It  was 
done  with  a  certain  caution.  The  figures  I will  give  you  are  before  tax 
returns on  average overnight  positions. The marginal costs that one could 
trace  to  particular  transactions  have  been  subtracted.  No  attempts  have 
been  made to  make  allocations for  fixed  overhead, such  as  the  cost of  a 
seat,  member dues, or the value of the market  maker's time;  but the gross, 
before-tax  return  on  investments for  active stocks  ranges  from  about  100 
percent  to  200  percent  per  year,  in  round  rumbers. 
McqUOWN: What  is  the comparable return to an investor holding the 
same  stocks  for  a  year  in  his  portfolio? 
SMIDT:  I think there is some data from Merrill  Lynch  that suggests about 
9  or  10  percent  per  year. 
PAINTER:  Is  that  a  negative  return? 
McqUOWN:  I would  like  to  ask  Don  Weeden  in  which of these  two 
categories,  the  investor  or  speciali5t,  do  your  returns  fall? 
WEEDEN:  I would  say,  traditionally,  we  have  averaged  a  15  percent 
after-tax  return,  with  the  exception  of the  last  two  years. ----__ ,_,----------~~--~---------------, 
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McqUOWN:  After  taxes? 
WEEDEN:  Aiter  taxes. 
McqUOWN: Now I would like to go  bitlk to  Dun Feuerstein. Where  is 
the  subsidy?  I  do  nut  understand  ",Vhat  you  mean  by  subsid~'  when 
specialists  are  earning  those  kinds  01  rates. 
FEUERSTEIN:  I did not  mean  to  indicate that  it  is  my opinion that  the 
subsidv  in fact  takes  place.  I was  merely posing the  theoretical  argument 
used  t~  rationalize  the  specialist  system. 
McqUOWN:  Is  it  your  opinion  that  it  does  take  place? 
FEUERSTEIN:  In  all  too  few  cases. 
HELLER:  To  be  sure  we  do not mix apples  and  oranges,  Sy,  I think the 
response  Don  Weeden  made  was  for  the  after-tax  return  on  investment 
for  a period which I assume  to be  a year.  Am  I correct in that,  Don?  You 
can  look at  the statistics on  a New York specialist operation,  which show 
the  after-tax  return,  or  the  pretax  return,  and  they  are  not  100  to  200 
percent.  I am being very defensive of New York specialists, saying they just 
are  not  that  large. 
SMIDT:  Where  do  you  find  the  after-tax  returns  on  average  overnight 
positions?  I would  like to  see  them. 
HELLER:  I am not talking about average overnight positions. I am talking 
about what is taught in business  school. If you invest in $100 in a business 
and you make $15 after taxes in an  accounting period, the rate at return on 
invested  capital,  as  I  compute  it,  is  15  percent.  I  don't care  what  it  is 
overnight;  I care what it is over an accounting period, over a year's period 
of  time. 
WEEDEN:  If you  want to  relate such  figures  to  ours,  we carried inven-
tories over the  last  twenty years  averaging three or  four times our capital. 
But  if you  want  to  take  it  overnight,  then  it  is  one-third. 
FEUERSTEIN:  Actual/y,  it 5hould  be  pointed  out,  Sy's  figures  are  not 
return on  equity, but return on  total  positions.  If.  in  fact,  a specialist had a 
100 percent annual  return on  positions, assuming that  he  operated on  10 
percent margin,  that  would amount to  a  1,000 percent  annual  return  on 
equity,  before  interest  costs. 
HELLER:  Right,  but  the  response  to  this  question,  a  key  question,  is, 
Aren't  you  as  a businessman  interested  in  the  return  on  your  invested 
capital,  figures  for which are available for  the  specialist system  as  well  as 
the  third  market? 
McqUOWN: And the answer,  I think,  is on  the order oi 1,000 percent. 
HELLER:  No way.  The answer on the figures I looked at-reported to the 
SEC,  and  I'm  not  defending the  New York  specialist-were somewhere 
around  15  to  20  percent  on  invested  capital. 
SMIDT:  You  made  some statements  about what is  taught  in  a business 
school about how to  figure return on investment. Since I have spent a good 
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part  of  my  professional  life  teaching students  in  business  schools  how  to 
compute  return  on  investment,  I can  assure  you  that  the  figures  we 
produced at the SEC were the kind of figures  I would expect Jfi intelligent 
businessman  to  produce,  or  at  least  as  nearly  like  that  as  I could  make 
them.  I was  very  cautious about  not  allocating costs  w'hen  there  was  no 
rational  basis  for  the allocation.  I don't want to try  to  give a figure  that  is 
comparable to what D'1n  gets because I really don't have enough data.  But 
I am  prepared tv stake my  ~rofession;>~ reputation on the basis of that data; 
and  knowing  something  aboi.:!  ine  other  costs,  I  say  that  those  were 
monopoly  profits.  Any  reasonable  person  who  had  any  experience  in 
market  making,  who  had  an  opportunity  to  make  those  kinds  of  profits, 
would  be  very  happy  indeed  to  get  into  that  kind  of  business. 
HELLER:  Sy,  all  I can  say  by  way  of  response  is  that  the  figures  are 
available  for  New  York  specialists.  I have  looked at  them;  Commissioner 
Loomis,  I assume,  has  looked  at  them;  and  they  do  not  run  in  that 
magnitude. 
SMIDT:  Where  are  they  available? 
HELLER:  At  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission. 
SMIDT:  In  what  report? 
PAINTER:  Perhaps  Commissioner  Loomis  could  clarify  this  point. 
LOOMIS:  I am  afraid  I am  utterly  confused.  I have  not  seen  figures  of 
1,000  percent.  I have seen figures  computed in  various ways,  but  I really 
do  not  think  we  have  a  real  figure  for  the  specialist's  return.  I know  the 
exchange  comes  out  with  figures.  I am  not  an  economist,  and  I do  not 
know  how  to  get  to  where  they  are. 
FARRAR:  Are  there  publicly available  figures  on  returns  by  specialists, 
other  than  those  in  the  Institutional  Investor  Study  Report? 
LOOMIS:  I have  never  heard  of  them. 
HELLER:  The  New  York  Stock  Exchange  has  submitted  data  to  the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  which  deal  with  the  New  York 
specialists  who  do  not  do a  public  business.  I do  not  want to  recall  the 
figures  from  memory. I have looked at them for a three-year period of time, 
and  from  memory  the  rate  of  return  on  invested  capital,  which  we  will 
define  as  including  all  subordinated  capital,  is  in  the  magnitude  of  20 
percent  after  all  expenses. 
SMIDT:  Including  their  imputed  salaries? 
HELLER:  Including  reasonable  compensation. 
SMIDT:  Anybody  could  make  the  salaries  high  enough and define  the 
capital  base  broadly  enough  and  add  sufficiently  large  accrual  items  to 
make  the  returns  low  enough to  appear reasonable.  That  would not  be  a 
reasonable  way  to  calculate  return  on  investment,  however. 
LOOMIS:  Those  are  the  kinds  of concerns  I have,  so  I do  not  want to 
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PAINTER:  I would like  to turn the discussion to  anothpr rather interesting 
point.  Namely,  if  you  combine the  th!rd.  market  with  the  markets  ?eing 
made  by  the  exchanges,  with  the specIal,sts  on  the pxchi1nges,  and  If the 
specialists are,  at  least on  the  New.  York  Stock  Excha nge,  pr~cI~ded from 
dealing  directly  with  institutional  Investors  by  Rule  1  13,  will  It  also  be 
necessary either to impose a counterpart of Rule .1  I  3~ on  mar~et  ~akers  such 
as Don Weeden in the third market, or do away wIth Rule  I I] Itselt? Does any 
member of  the  panel  wish  to  comment  on  that  question? 
FEUERSTEIN:  It seems  to  me,  the solution  to  the  1 13  problem depends 
upon  the  type  of  structure  you  wish  to  have  for  market  making  in  the 
central  market  system.  Rule  1 13,  as  presently  designed,  serves  two  pur-
poses.  The  first  purpose  is  to  prevent  market  makers  from  having  an 
incentive to  manipulate their market in order to  facilitate large  institutional 
orders.  The  other  purpose  of  Rule  I 13  is  to  preserve  the  institutional 
commission  business.  This  rests  on  a  theory  that  if  institutions  Were 
allowed to  have direct access to  market makers,  they would do so  in  many 
cases to the exclusion of broker-dealers who presently receive commission 
business for doing so.  Now,  the other side of the Rule  I 13 problem is that 
the  essence  of being a  market  maker,  and  trading  against  the  market,  is 
knowing  more  about supply and demand than  other  market  participants. 
This  places  the  dealer  in  a  better  position  to  distinguish  between 
temporary imbalances that arise  because of the  irregular flo\V of orders  to 
the market and imbalances that arise because of more fundamental factors. 
If  a  market  maker attempts  to  buy  stock  when  there  is  an  imbalance of 
supply over demand because investors  think  the stock  is  overpriced, he  is 
not  going  to  do anything but  lose  money.  On the  other hand,  if he  buys 
stock  when  there  is  an  imbalance of supply  over demand because there 
just happened to  be  more  sellers today,  and tomorrow there will  be more 
bUyers,  he  is  going to  make  money.  In  the original  days of the  New  York 
Stock  Exchange,  when  the  market  was  basically  individual.  supply  and 
demand  were  represented  by  the  specialist's  book.  To  the  extent that  he 
knew  what  was  in  his  book,  and  nobody  else  did,  he  had  superior 
knowledge  of supply  and  demand  on  which  to  trade.  Today,  the  rea! 
supply and demand situation  is  no  longer on  the specialist's book.  It is  in 
the  intentions of people like the institutional traders  in  this  room.  Unless the 
market maker  is  able io talk to  them and figure  out what they are doing or 
would like  to  do,  he  is  not  going to  be  in  a position  to  make a market  in 
any  depth.  That  is  the  Rule  I 13  problem. 
Now,  there are two  ways,  I think,  to solve  it,  assuming that we  want  to 
have  markets  in  depth.  One is  to eliminate Rule  I 13  entirely, allowing all 
market  makers  to  deal  directly  with  institutions.  The  other  alternative, 
which  was  recommended  by  the  SEC's  block  trading  committ.:e,  is  to 
recognize that there are two different functions involved in  mary.et making. 
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One  is  the  institutional market-making function, and  the other is  the retail 
market-making function. The  second  is  essentially  an  administrative func-
tion  of  kf'P[)ing  an  orderly  hundrprl-~har('  market,  intervening  in  that 
market  in  small  degree  from  time to  time,  and  keeping the  book.  If  it is 
decided that you want to separate those two functions, then it is possible to 
have a specialist who does not deal directly with institutions, but who also 
does  not  have  very  great  in-depth  responsibilities,  and  upstairs  market 
makers,  or backup market makers-whatever you  wanl to call them-who 
do  deal  directly  with  institutions  and  are  expected  to  make  markets  in 
depth.  In  my opinion  the  one  alternative  that  is  not  possible  is  to  have 
in-depth  market  makers  to  whom  Rule  113  applies. 
NEWMAN:  I disagree with  Donald 100 percent  on  this  issue.  I believe 
that  it is possible to  make  in-depth markets and provide continuity in  100-
(Ind  200-share  markets,  and  I  think  my  firm  does  so. 
I (an "peak only for  my firm  and  my partners on the discussion  of Rule 
113. If Rule  113  were removed and  Salomon Brothers; or Goldman, Sachs; 
or Merrill  Lynch decided to compete with us  because we had  the ability to 
communicate  with  institutions  directly,  the  possibility  of  our  building a 
distribution  network to compete with them  would be  virtually impossible, 
due  to  the  cost  involved. One thing I can  say,  and  it  is  only a humorous 
aside:  I think if that  happened I would ask for myoid job bilck at Salomon 
Brothers.  We  do  believe  that  the  two functions  can  work  logether;  we 
do it now.  Donald's argument  is  that he  does not think that  is  prevalent in 
too  many  cases.  Hovv  can  you  build  a  systf'm  if it  is  not  prevalent  in 
enough  cases  to  make the  system  viable?  My  views  are  solely those  of a 
partner  in  Weiss,  Peck  &  Greer. 
LEWIS:  I have two questions. One, relates to  Ruie  113:  Does it in effect 
preclude  the  specialist  from  speaking  to  the  institution  in  the  case  of a 
position bid? If a position floor broker goes to the floor-and if he goes to 
the  fioor  he  obviously opens  a dialogue with the  specialist-and says,  "I 
am considering making a bid on  100,000 or 50,000 or 30,000, whatever it 
is,  what  can  you  do?" Is  it  really the  position house  or  is  it  the  specialist 
who is  talking to  the  institution? 
FEUERSTEIN:  I think that is a good point. The specialist does talk directly 
to the institution today in two respects. One, he does so through firms such 
as mine. Second,  he can talk to them directly, because the  New York Stock 
Exchange  has  interpreted  Rule  113  as  not  precluding  specialists  from 
"communicating" with institutions; they  merely cannot do direct business 
with them.  Indeed, the good specialists, who do make in-depth markets, do 
have direct contact with  institutions.  That  raises  a question  if Rule  113  is 
designed  to  preclude  the  conflict of interest  arising  because  a  specialist 
knows  what  the  institution  is  doing.  In  fact,  the  specialist  is  allowed and 
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Rule  113  presently serve,  then,  except to  prf.'serve  the  institutional broker-
age  business?  . 
MENDElSON:  You  two have been  talking solely about Rlilp  113,  but I 
would like to  ask  Mr.  Newman  vl/hether  he can  live with the  abolition of 
Rule 394.  If we  abolish Rule  394, Goldman, SiKhs and  Salomon  Brothers 
can  be  partners. 
NEWMAN: I can  exist with the abolition of Rule 394,  because  I feel  that 
the  markets  my  firm makes  are  competitive and  will be  as  competitive as 
anybody else can  make  them.  I feel  we are  well enough capitalized to  be 
competitive  with  anybody, 
WEEDEN:  If  you,  in  the  central  market  system,  make  a  competitive 
market  atmosphere,  and  if you  take  the  book  or  the  responsibility  for 
public orders away from all market makers through a computerized system 
that  would  be  part of NASDAQ or whatever quotation  system  you  have, 
what  public  interest  regulatory  justification  remains  for  Rule  113,  for 
anybody? 
PAINTER:  I myself would  have  difficulty justifying  Rule  113  if certain 
assumptions were  made:  if we  did have fully competitive rates;  if We  did 
have adequate competition, or vigorous competition, between adequately 
capitalized market makers and  specialists in different parts of the  system.  It 
would seem  to  me  that  the  force  of competition  itself would bring to  the 
marketplace the  kind of liqUidity that  you  would want  to  have.  I am  not 
sure myself just why you would insist upon retaining Rule  113  in that type 
of environment. 
LOOMIS:  I think I agree  with that.  As  Don  said,  one  of the  reasons for 
Rule  113,  and  perhaps  the  only  regulatory  reason,  was  because  of the 
environment that  existed when  a specialist,  in effect, determined what the 
price was  going  to  be  by  his  quotes,  and  the  necessity  to  prevent  their 
manipulation  to  accommodate  or to  attract  institutional  customers.  In  a 
more  competitive  environment  that  may  not  remain  a  problem. 
PAINTER:  Perhaps this gets  us  back to the basic question of the  effect of 
the  composite  quotation  system  on  the  regional  markets.  If Mr.  Newman 
and  his  firm  make  the  kind  of vigorous  market  that  he  says  he  makes, 
perhaps  all  the  business  still would flow to  the New York Stock  Exchal"!ge, 
and  very  little  would be  left  for  the  regionals.  In  which  case,  with all 
deference,  we  might  have  to  reinstate  Rule  113. 
RICKERSHAUSER:  Isn't  it  true,  in  the  over-the-counter  market,  the 
institution  is  under a legal  obligation  to  go  directly  to  a market  maker? 
FEUERSTEIN:  No,  it  is  not true.  There  is  one decision by the  Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission,  the  Delaware Management  case,  where  the 
commission  held  that  when  an  institution,  in  that  case  a  mutual  fund, 
interpositions a broker in order to reward him for some other service, this is 
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Management  Regulation  has  gone  way  beyond  that  case  in  trying  to 
prevent  investment  companies  from  ever  using  brokers  in  the  over-the-
counter market.  With  respect to  other institutions, the Institutional  Investor 
study found  that those institutions which art,' !lot subject to SEC  regulation, 
i.e ..  pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  etc.,  frequently  use  brokers  in 
the over-the-counter market.  Brokers  also  are used  frequently  in  the bond 
market  in  cases  where  an  institution  either  does  not  know  the  market 
maker,  or does not  want  to  deal  with  him  directly,  or  does  not  want  the 
market maker to know who he  is or what he  is doing. The  lesson,  however, 
is  that  although brokers are used in  those situations,  they  really  do  not get 
paid  very  much,  because  they  are  not  doing  very  much. 
HELLER:  I think that  in  the  perfect world that  Don Weeden describes,  I 
would  have  less trouble with  Rule  113. However, in  the real  world, where 
limit orders, as at  present, are being held by  ~peciali5ts, New York  as  well 
as  regional,  I find  it  difficult  to  see where the focal  point of the specialist's 
knowledge,  as well  as the  knowledge of the  book,  is  constructive in  terms 
of  his  dealing  with  the  ultimate  customer  or  the  institution.  With  an 
electronic  book,  of  course,  where  specialists  do  not  hold  limit  orders,  I 
would  see Rule  113  as  providing no  salutory effects.  I think  there may  be 
quite  different  interim  steps  and  final  steps. 
FARRAR:  I conclude from  the  panel's response  to  my  earlier  question 
that  a composite tape does not  by  itseif create a central market system;  if 
so,  and  if  it  also  is  clear  that  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  will  not 
voluntarily  enter into  the  development of  a composite quotation system, 
then I wonder about the viability, or the usefulness, of a cornbination of the 
composite  tape  including  all  market  centers  and  a composite  quotation 
system  that  includes  only  regional  exchanges  and  third-market dealers-
indeed, that  might  include the enti;e marketplace except for  the New York 
Stock  Exchange.  Barry Tague is  a regional exchange special ist  who appar-
ently utilizes NASDAQ and perhaps AutEx to connect his marketplace to at 
least some other significant marl<'etplaces.  I wonder if you could comment, 
Barry,  on  the  possibility  of  developing  a  significant  mi ni  central  market 
system,  containing all  market  centers except  New York,  through  such  an 
information  system. 
TAGUE:  I think  it  probably  has  been  reported  already that  discussions 
are  moving  along  these  lines.  Regional  stock  exchanges are  considering 
putting  together  a  composite  quotation  system,  in  concert  I  believe, 
ultimately,  with  the third market.  We want to  move as quickly as  possible 
toward some type of composite quotation system. We presently are explor-
ing ways  of  doing  just  exactly  that  in  the  event  that  we  cannot get  New 
York  to  go  along. 
IRELAND:  There are only twelve  men in  this  room who are going to be 
doing what  all you  gentlemen are recomrnending. I suggest to you that we, 350  \·v.  H.  Pdintpr.  D.  M.  h'Ut'r,lt'in,  R.  M.  Np~\'m,m,  B.  f.  Tagut.  -
as traders, are looking forward  to having all  the' options in  front of Us at the 
time  we  wish  to  makp  a  trade.  Historic,llly,  up  to  19)8,  \\'('  generally 
would use  an  agent  tu  get all  that  information.  Now  w(>  have  NASDAQ. 
AutEx,  and  instinct,  Jnd we used to  have 13llJlk. AutomatIOn System  (BAS). 
We  have a great deal of input  from  brokers  who take  thl' timp  to  call  us. 
We also  use agents to go to  the floor to get information. All  we are talking 
about  is  one  thing,  and  that  is  to  give  llS  options.  When  you  talk  about 
taking away Rule  113  and doing all  the  other things,  what you  really  are 
discussing  is  the  best  way to  get  those options.  In  this  last  discussion this 
afternoon about the composite quote system,  we  are dealing with  an area 
where there  are  a great  many  options.  It's  just  very  simple.  We  are  the 
ones,  the traders,  who are going to decide how we are  going to  trade.  but 
you  are  the  guys  who  are  going  to  set  the  rules. 
TAGUE:  I think  that,  in  a nutshell,  is  why  the  regional stock exchanges 
are  very  anxious  to  have  composite  quotations.  It  gives  us  a  form  of 
exposure  that  we  presently  do  not  have.  We are  proud  of  many  of our 
market  makers.  We  think  they  can be competitive.  We think  they (an be 
competitive  with  the  Weiss,  Peck's.  We  do  not  think  that  our  market 
makers  are,  in  general,  as  deep and  as  viable  as  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange  specialists;  but  we  will  pit  a  few  of ours  against  them.  This  is 
what  we  want  the  opportunity  to  do.  We  think,  just  as  Mr.  Ireland  has 
suggested.  when  people start seeing viable,  competitive markets develop-
ing  from  either  the  PBW  market  center,  Boston,  Midwest,  or Pacific,  that 
they  will  begin  to avail  themselves of an option they would not otherWise 
know  exists. 
SMIDT:  I think I have to come back to the SUbject of subsidies. I failed to 
say  something I should have said,  in  fairness  to  the  New  York  specialists' 
community.  Don  raised  the  point  of  subsidies  by  large  stocks  for  small 
stocks.  We did  not  find  any evidence of that.  There was  something that I 
think  YOll  could  call  a subSidy  going on  in  some  cases.-if you  conclude 
that  a subSidy  is  present if a person does not  make  as large a profit as  he 
might  have  made  under the  circumstances,  and gives  somebody else  the 
benefit of it.  As an economist, I vvould cali that a subSidy.  What we  found 
was  that  there  were  some  specialists,  with  respect  to  their  most  active 
stocks,  who  were  subsidizing  their  customers.  From  the  nature  of  the 
activity  of  the  stocks,  I would  presume,  in  most  cases,  that  they  were 
subsidizing their  institutional  customers,  and  it  was  these  specialists who 
were  providing the  best  markets.  The  nature of the  subsidy was  that  they 
were  not  getting  lower  income;  they  were  investing  more  capital  and 
taking  larger  risks  for  no  greater  income  than  other  specialists  were. 
HEWITT;  let me  ask  Barry  Tague just one question.  You  said that  if  we 
went  to  negotiated  rates  first,  that  it  vvould  eventually do  av./ay  with  the 
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TA~UE:  Potenti.all.y,  I  said  that  is  a  distinct  possibility.  Obviously, 
negotiated  rates eliminate the  need for  a stock exchange as  we  know  it.  I 
think  the  thing  I am  concerned about  is  the  experjence~ of our  industry 
where we  have  negotiated commissions, at  the $300,000 level and above. 
A lot of well-intentioned firms  attempted to  compete, in  the early stages of 
negotiated  rates,  with  the  larger,  well-capitalized  firms  having  greater 
expertise.  We  are  finding  that  those  firms  are  dropping  by  the  wayside 
daily.  Firms  are closing up their  institutional trading departments.  The big 
remain;  the  many  have  disappeared. 
On  the  other hand,  you  have  in  NASDAQ  a semblance of a composite 
quotation system, or central market system, in the over-the-counter market. 
What  has  been  the  result of  that? The focus  of attention  has  moved  away 
from the New York  Hanseatics, the Singer Mackies, the Trostel' Singers, ihe 
firms  that  commanded  a  tremendous  correspondent business  because of 
their  location,  their contacts, etc.  It  has  put  the  I  ittle  broker-dealer on  the 
map.  It  has given him an  opportunity to compete in a fashion that  he  never 
had before.  He does not  necessarily have to  compete in  the same depth as 
the  New  York  Hanseatics, but nevertheless,  he  is  there and somebody can 
choose him.  I think that is the position of the regional stock exchange. That 
is  why  we  see the  move toward negotiated commissions as  aiding the big 
at  the  expense of the  small and the  many. We see the advent of a central 
market  system,  or  the  imposition  of  the  various  foundation  blocks  for  a 
central  market  system,  as  aiding the  smaller,  well-managed  regional  bro-
kers who we thi nk ~hould have an opportunity to remain and become viable 
elements  of  the  system. 
MENDELSON:  I just want to  make an observation. Mr.  Tague has told  us 
that  the  securities industry  is  interested  j  n the  central  market and  that we 
should  reverse  the  procedure; we should go to  the central market first  and 
then  to  negotiated rates.  But  I have  not  seen any great anxiety on  the part 
of  the  securities  industry  to  implement  the  consolidated  quotation 
system-to actually use  the guts of the central market.  It  has  only been the 
advent of competitive rates that has pushed the industry  in  that direction. 
TAGUE:  There  is  a  lot  of  truth  in  what  you  say.  I  think  we  have 
attempted  to  move  forward  in  this  area  in  concert.  We  regional  stock 
exchanges  initially  felt  that  you  could  not  go  into  a composite quotation 
system,  into a composite tape,  without the New  York Stock  Exchange. We 
finally  became frustrated with  the  prospects, and have now explored ways 
in  which  we  migh, do it  alone.  Obviously,  we are smaller;  we are  not  as 
well  capitalized.  It  is  going to  take money to  implement, and  it  is  going to 
fly  in  the  face  of those regional stock exchange boards where the  majority 
of  members  represent  New  York  Stock  Exchange  interests.  We  have  a 
uniqUE situation  in  Philadelphia, which  I do not  think any other exchange 
has-perhaps Boston  might  be  an  exception.  The  majority  of our  board 352  W.  H.  Painter,  D.  M.  Feuerstein,  R.  M.  Newman  BETa 
,_.  .  gut'  -
members do not come from New York Stock Exchange membpr firms.  So I 
think  we  can  move  a little qUicker  into  these  areas  of compPlifion  With' 
New  York  than  can  the  other regional  slack  exchanges.  We  are,  in  any 
case,  exploring  the  possibility  of going  it  alone. 